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COMMENTS

COMMENT
LOCAL, IN REM, AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS:
GENERAL DOCTRINE AND ARKANSAS VARIATION

N Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison,' an Arkansas flying service
sued a Missouri landowner in Arkansas in accounting for
spraying defendant's land with insecticide; the landowner defended on the ground that the flying service misrepresented the
insecticides. As to this suit the Arkansas court had jurisdiction.
The landowner then filed a cross-complaint against the manu.
facturer for damage done to his growing crop, and the question
arose as to whether the Arkansas court could entertain an action
for injuries to land located in another state. Held, the Arkansas
court had jurisdiction.
The court recognized that its holding was contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority.' The general rule, which finds its
basis in the old common law of England, is to the effect that a
state cannot entertain suit for injury to land located in another
state.' The English courts clearly developed a distinction between
so-called "local" and "transitory" actions, holding that local
1220 Ark. 521, 249 S. W. 2d 994 (1952), noted, 30 A.L.R. 2d 1213 (1953), and
65 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1952).
2 Id. at 995. The court notes "...that with the exception of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota every American Court that has passed upon the question (and there have
been about twenty) has held that jurisdiction does not exist."
3 Skinner v. East India Co., 6 How. St. Tr. 710 (1665); Doulson v. Matthew, 4
Tern Rep. 503, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1792) ; Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock 203, 4 Hughes
606, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, Fed. Cas. No. 8411 (C.C. 4th, 1811); Ellenwood v. Marietta
Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 15 S. Ct. 771 (1895) (rule recognized), 39 L. Ed. 913; British
South Africa Co. v. Companhia di Mocambique, A. C. 602 (1893) ; Rackow v. United
Excavating Co., 67 F. Supp. 699 (rule recognized) (D.C.N.J. 1946).
Contra: Minnesota, Little v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896);
Louisiana, because of Civil Law background, 4 LA. ANN. 63 (1849) ; Virginia, CODE OF
VIRGINIA, § 8-866, p. 559; New York, NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW, § 536; Missouri,
Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153 S. W. 2d 547 (1941), under Missouri venue
statutes actions affecting title are not local unless they directly affect title.
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actions must be tried where the cause of action arose." Thus, the
English courts refused jurisdiction of suits for injury to foreign
lands.' As to suits within England itself, the rule presented no
problem, for while such suits were required to be tried where the
cause of action arose, process could be served anywhere in the
country, and thus the plaintiff could always bring the defendant
to trial. When the tortfeasor crossed national boundaries, however,
application of the rule often resulted in wrongs going without
redress.
Brought to the United States, this doctrine was applied among
the states as it had been among the several nations.6 Here, the
opportunities for injustice were multiplied by the fact that there
exists between the states a greater freedom of intercourse than
between nations; hence, there is a greater probability (1) that
land will be injured by interstate traffic, and (2) that tortfeasors
will evade service of process by reason of the free ingress and
egress among the states. This fact, coupled with the restriction
prohibiting the process of a state from crossing that state's boundaries, leaves many injured parties without remedy.
In the leading case of Livingston v. Jefferson,7 Justice Marshall, after reocognizing this problem, reluctantly agreed that the
general rule was too firmy established to allow departure. While
subsequent cases have almost universally accorded with this holdhave often echoed Marshall's dissatisfacing, the commentators
8
result.
the
tion with
The Arkansas court was divided in the principal case, and the
resulting opinions afford an excellent summary and examination
4 5 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENtGL. LAw 117 (1924).

A local action is the type

action which could occur only at a particular place. A transitory action could occur
anywhere. Thus, local actions are those involving injury or dispute as to land, whereas
transitory actions pertain to persons and movable property.
5 d.

6 Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock 203, 4 Hughes 606, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, Fed. Cas. No.
8411 (4th Cir. 1811).
7Id.
SNote, 18 Val. Rev. 691 (1931); 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1952).
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of the reasons which have compelled adherence to the rule. Commenting upon the argument that the courts of one state are without
the practical ability to pass upon title to land located in another,
the majority opinion cites the nature of an American state Supreme Court Library as an adequate resource from which the
court may ascertain the law of any state. The dissent counters
that "land actions are tried in lower courts and not in the Supreme
Court Library," and to illustrate the point, Justice McFadden
comments on the skill necessary to try a Trespass to Try Title
suit in Texas.9
The majority points out that all state courts will pass upon an
out of state title when the issue arises incidentally in a transitory
action. Thus a situation may arise in which ".... two companion
suits, one local and one transitory, were presented to the same
court together. In these states where the courts disclaim the ability
to pass upon questions of title in local actions, it might be necessary for the court to dismiss the local action for that reason and
yet decide the identical question in the allied transitory case."'"
This holding, the dissent submits, would eliminate, in effect, the
distinction between local and transitory actions and would permit
the state to determine ejectment actions involving lands located
in other states, "and while we might undertake to do this . . the
full faith and credit clause of the U. S. Constitution would not
require the sister state to recognize our judgment."
If the necessary effect of the majority opinion would be to
allow a state to decide such actions, then the dissent would seem
to be well founded. Furthermore, the broad language of the
majority opinion allows that interpretation, and at no point does
it specifically negative such possibility. Nevertheless, it is highly
improbable that such a result was intended, and it is clearly not
a necessary incident of the holding. The principal case merely
9This observation would seem to be entirely irrelevant, since adherence to Texas
substantive law would not require utilization of the peculiar Texas procedure.
10 Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, supra, note 1 at 996.
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holds that an Arkansas court will entertain a suit for damages
to land in another state-that is, that the nature of such a suit
as a "local" action is eliminated. Does it necessarily follow that
the "local" nature of an ejectment action is also abolished? The
distinction between the two types of suits is basic in that the
action for damages is in personam, while the suit in ejectment is,
by nature, in rem. Query: Does this distinction remove the ejectment proceeding from the scope of the Arkansas holding?
In order to facilitate a discussion of this question, we will consider briefly the distinction between an in rem action and a local
action. The shades of meaning between the two terms may be
clearly drawn from the cases." A local action is one which could
occur only at a particular place. Thus it must involve an immovable. An in rem suit includes all actions against particular things,
whether real or personal. The term "local" includes actions
against persons, (e.g. trespass), but the term "in rem" does not.
Though an ejectment suit falls within the meaning of both local
and in rem, a trespass action is not "in rem" for it is an action
against the person. As to in rem suits involving lands in one
state, lack of jurisdiction in another state would seem unquestionable, if only because the sister state would not be required to
honor any judgment rendered by the forum state. But to the extent
that the term "local" includes actions against persons, at least
this reason for want of jurisdiction falls; for there is nothing to
prevent a court of one state from enforcing its judgment against
an individual, whether he is a citizen of that state or not, so long
as the court has jurisdiction over his person. This fundamental
difference would seem to justify the conclusion that the Arkansas
11 In Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1029, Lord Mansfield made
the distinction: "There is a formal and a substantial distinction as to the locality of
trials. I state them as different things: the substantial distinction is, where the proceed.
ing is in rem, and where the effect of the judgment cannot be had, if it is laid in the
wrong place. That is the case of all ejectments. . . ." The formal distinction as to the
locality of trials was stated to be the venue or place or county in which any suit must
be brought in order that process may be issued and a trial had.
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court did not intend, nor did it effect the inclusion of in rem proceedings within the scope of its holding.
As a second point, the majority in the principal case stated
that because of the free intercourse among the states, the common
law rule is not as justified as if applied among nations. 2 The
dissent asserts that this reasoning relegates the states to the level
of mere administrative units, contrary to their inherent position
as sovereign powers.
Third, the majority notes the reluctance of a nation to subject
its own citizens to suits by aliens as another reason often submitted in support of the general rule. Recognizing this to be a nat.
ural incident of the inherent jealousies among the nations, the
court finds no logical foundation for this concept when applied
against a sister state. Arkansas is ". . . not . ., compelled to provide a sanctuary . . . for those who have willfully and wrongfully . . . inflicted . . . injuries upon innocent landowners in
[other] states."'" The majority cites its State Bill of Rights as
providing that every wrong shall have a remedy and submits that
the adoption of the general rule would preclude this possibility.
"Under the majority rule, we should have to tell the plaintiff
that he would have been much better off had the petitioner had
stolen his cotton outright instead of merely damaging it... We
12 The court points out that nations, through control over passports and ports of
entry, can retain tortfeasors within the reach of their process. Since the states do not
have comparable powers, the court argues that the general rule is less justifiable when
applied among the states. As pointed out earlier in the text, the greater freedom of
movement among the several states does increase the possibility that wrongs will go
without redress under the general rule. Nevertheless, the argument utilized by the
majority at this point seems to be ill-founded since in many cases, including the principal case, the fact that a nation has the power to detain persons within its borders
affords no real relief from the harm which frequently results under the general rule.
In the principal case, for example, the action was against the insecticide manufacturer
who was never in Missouri; furthermore, had the action been against the flying company, the opportunity for service, whether by a state or a nation, would seem slim,
since (1) the plane did not land in Missouri and (2) the damage to the plaintiff's
land probably could not have been discovered until defendant had had ample time
to leave the state, even though he might he required to go through customs, acquire
a passport, etc. The first of these factors, it is true, is peculiar to the unusual facts
of this case; the second however, would seem to have general application.
13 Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, supra note 1, at 996.
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prefer to afford this litigant his day in court." 4 The dissent contends that the result reached by the majority is judicial legislation that "[t]his is an argument that should be made-if at allin the legislative branch of government, rather than in a judicial
opinion."15
Though contrary to the general common law rule, the Arkansas decision has been found commendable," for the general rule

has been criticized when applied. 7
Having examined the general rule and the Arkansas variation

thereof, it seems not amiss to consider briefly the several problems
which arise in these jurisdictions following the general rule with
reference to its application, and further to give some attention to
the federal rules concerning the several facets of this problem.
The general rule is usually held inapplicable where extrastate
timber, stones, or sand, etc., are converted, because upon severance
the property becomes personalty and the subject of a transitory
14 Ibid.
5 Id. at 998.
16 Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1952).
17 Livingston v. Jefferson, supra note 3.
For a more recent criticism of the rule, see Note, 18 Va. L. Rev. 691 (1931).
Because the common law rule was based upon the distinction between local and
transitory actions, Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Ed. 3, vol. 5, p. 140 (1924) ;
Hancock, TORTS IN THE CONFLICT Or LAWS, pp. 1-5 (1942) ; Leplar, A TREATISE ON
THE ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAW, § 4, p. 55 (1938); Kuhn, LOCAL AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 66 U. Penn. L. Rev. 301 (1918), courts
have considered statutes significant which define and limit venue of local actions,
42 A.L.R. 196, at 213. (It was believed that the general rule rested not on lack of
jurisdiction, but upon inability to lay venue in the forum when the injured land was
located out of state; but when the venue statutes were abrogated in England, the
House of Lords found a lack of jurisdiction, Brit. S. Africa v. Mocambique, A. C. 619
(1893). This holding seems to be in accord with the American view. Thus, the effect
of venue statutes has been less meaningful). An Arkansas statute, ARK. STAT. 1947
ANN., § 27"601, required that actions for injury to realty be brought in the county in
which the land is located. But an earlier Supreme Court decision had construed a
similar venue statute inapplicable upon extrastate causes of action, K.C.S. Ry. Co. v.
Ingram, 80 Ark. 269, 97 S.W. 55 (1906), and in light of this prior decision, Leflar, an
authority on Arkansas Conflict of Laws, anticipated a free determination by the Court
as to whether extrastate torts to realty are local or transitory. Leflar, A TREATISE ON
THE ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT or LAW, § 4, p. 57 (1938).
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action.'" And in many states the general rule is also held inapplicable where the tort is committed in one state causing injury
to realty in another. In such a case jurisdiction will lie either in
the state where the wrong was committed or in the state where
the land lies. 9 It has been suggested that this exception applies
in the Arkansas case as the manufacturer's acts occurred solely
in Arkansas;"0 however, it is noteworthy that the interstate exception has been applied to cases which fall within the English decision of strict liability based upon direct trespass." Until recent
years, the defendant manufacturer would not have been liable to
the plaintiff in the Arkansas case, for liability of an original
seller for damages caused by defects in his product was formerly
18 Ariz. Commercial Min. Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 19 Me. 213, 110 A. 429
(1920) ; Montesano Lumber Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 P. 244 (1915)
(rule recognized) ; Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 94 Ore. 677,
186 P. 428 (1920); Horne v. Howe Ybr. Co., 209 Ark. 202, 190 S. W. 2d 7 (1945);
Copper State Min. Co. v. Kelvin Lumber & Supply Co., 227 S. W. 938 (1921) (later
app. in 1921, 232 S. W. 858); Stone v. U. S.,167 U. S. 178, 17 S Ct. 778, 42 L. Ed. 127, 26
L.R.A. (N.S.) 927 (1897); Rackow v. United Excavating Co., 67 F. Supp. 699
(D.C.N.J. 1946), noted, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 (1947).
19 REST. OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), § 615; Vermont Valley R. Co. v. Conn. River
Power Co., 99 Vt. 397, 133 A. 367 (1926); Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio 489 (1848);
Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal, 1 Wall. Jr. 275, Fed. Cas. No. 12139 (aff. 1852);
Foot v. Edwards, 3 Blatchf. 310, Fed. Cas. No. 4908 (1853); Armendiaz v. Stillman,
54 Tex. 623 (1881) ; Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., 136 Ky. 162, 123 S. W. 678, 26 L.R.A.,
N.S. 927 (1909). But contrary: Howard v. Ingersoll, 17 Ala. 780 (1850) ; Eachus v.
Trustees of Ill. & Mich. Canal, 17 Ill. 534 (1856) ; Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, etc.
Co., 34 Brit. Col. 485 (1925) (semble) ; Albert v. Fraser Cos. (N.B.) 11 M.P.R. 209,
1 D.L.R. 39 (1937.)
Note: The problem of service is not considered here.
20 Note, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1242 (1952).
21 Prosser, HANDnOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941), § 13, p. 77; Newsom v. Anderson, 2 Ired. 42, 24 N.C. 42, 37 Am. Dec. 404 (1841); Lawson v. Price, 45 Md. 123
(1876); Harp v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159, 51 Am. Dec. 279 (1849); Bessemer Coal,
Iron & Land Co. v. Doak, 152 Ala. 166, 44 So. 627 (1907), 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 389;
Ashville Constr. Co. v. So. R. Co., 19 F. 2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927).
The exception has been applied to damages to land in one state caused by obstruction in a stream in another, Armendiaz v. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623 (1881) ; to damages
in one state caused by building a canal in another, Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal,
1 Wall. Jr. 275, Fed. Cas. No. 12139 (1849) (aff. in 1852), 14 How. (U.S.) 80, 14
L. Ed. 385; to damages to a mill in one state caused by diversion of a stream in another,
Foot v. Edwards, 3 Blatchf. 310, Fed. Cas. No. 4908 (1853) ; Mannville Co. v. Worcester,
138 Mass. 89, 52 Am. Rep. 261 (1884) : to damages to a building in one state caused
by an explosion in another; Smith v. So. R.B., 136 Ky. 162, 123 S.W. 678, 26 L.R.A.
927 (1909).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

limited to his immediate buyer." Today, a manufacturer's liability
to third persons is firmly established and is based upon negligence
or breach of warranty.2" Logically, it would seem that the interstate exception should be extended to include such wrongs and
that they should be actionable either where the wrong occurs or

where the injury results, without regard to whether the injury
occurs to land or to persons. Thus, on its facts the Reasor-Hill
case might plausibly have been construed to fall within this exception to the general rule.24 Had the court so found, its rejection
of the general rule would have been unecessary. But the court's
language was couched in terms which indicated that they mistakenly assumed that the cross-complaint was against the flying
service, and, thus, that both the wrong and the injury occurred
in Missouri.25
Even though many states allow interstate torts to realty to be
maintained either in the state of origin or in the state of the injury,26 some refuse jurisdiction;27 among the latter is Oregon.28 In
22 Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941)

§ 83, p. 674; Hasbreck T.

Armour & Co., 139 Wisc. 357, 121 N.W. 157, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 876 (1909); Burkett v.
Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912); Ligget & Myers
Tobacco Co. v. Cannon, 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S.W. 1009, L.R.A. 1916A, 940, Ann. Cas.
1917A, 179, (1915) ; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 61 L.R.A.
303 (8th Cir. 1903).
23 Note; Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Contractors; some recent developments, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1927); Russell, Manufacturer's Liability to Ultimate
Consumer, 21 Ky. L. J. 338 (1933) ; Israel, Liability of Manufacturer for Negligence,
8 So. Cal. L. Rev. 315 (1935) ; for other articles, see, Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS (1941), § 83, p. 674, footnote 45.
24 In Chapman Chemical Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W. 2d 820 (Ark. 1949), strict liability
was imposed on the manufacturer who was also the sprayer. In this light perhaps
the Reasor-Hill case would fall within the exception of the interstate trespasses without
the extension thereof.
25 E.g., the court said (1) by defendant flying over, plaintiff had no opportunity
to serve defendant, and (2) that the plaintiff would have been better off had defendant
stolen his crop rather than merely damaging it. The defendant to the cross-complaint
was the manufacturer, not the flying service.
26 See note 21 supra.
27 See note 21 supra.
28 Montesano Lumber Co. v. Portland Iron Works, 78 Ore. 53, 152 Pac. 244
(1915) (rule recognized); Montesano Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Portland Iron Works,
94 Ore. 677, 186 Pac. 428 (1920); Dippold v. Cathlamet Timber Co., 98 Ore. 183, 193
Pac. 909 (1920).
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a recent federal case, Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co.,2 fumes
from an Oregon plant injured Washington realty. The Washington
landowner sued for damages in a Washington federal district
court. The defendant sought transfer to the Oregon federal district
court under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)." The Washington district court
held that inherent in sec. 1404(a) was the mandate that the transferee forum be one where suit "might be brought," and that here
the landowner could not have brought suit in Oregon because
Oregon has no power to entertain actions for trespasses in foreign
jurisdictions and thus lacks the required jurisdiction of the subject
matter. The court maintained the doctrine of lack of jurisdiction
was binding because of the inherent character of the rule as purely
substantive law and because of the holdings in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,"' that federal courts apply local substantive law.
The Arvidson decision raises the problem as to which rule a
federal court sitting in Arkansas should apply to the fact situation
presented in the Reasor-Hill case. Since the Erie case, the federal
court must apply the substantive law of the state in which it is
sitting. Thus, if a suit is against a trespasser to foreign land, a
federal court sitting in Arkansas should apply the Arkansas law.
However, Erie v. Tompkins and other cases82 were situations in
which the "closed door policy" of the state was held to "close the
door" of the federal court. The question remains whether the
federal court is required to "open its door" in cases in which the
"door" of the state court is open. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York
v. York,8" a leading case on this point states the following rules:
29 107 F. Supp. 51 (1952).

80 The § reads:
"(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
31 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U. S. 183 (1947) ; Woods v. Inter.
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) ; Arvidson v. Reynolds Mfg., 107 F. Supp. 51

(D.C.W.D. Wash. 1952) ; Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co., 337 U.S.
530 (1949) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
ss Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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(1) Where federal jurisdiction is based upon a federal question,

the federal courts are required to follow the "open door policy"
of the state in actions at law; but as to suits in equity, no such

requirement exists as to either an open or closed door policy (i.e.,
the federal court need not follow the state rule at all)." (2)
Where federal jurisdiction attaches solely because of diversity,
whether the case be an action at law or a suit in equity, the outcome in the federal court should not lead to a substantially different result from that reached in the state court.35 It is conceiv-

able that equitable remedies could be sought in cases involving
injury to out-of-state lands, and in such situations resort would
have to be had to the distinctions drawn in Guaranty Trust, supra,
to determine the applicable federal rule. However, since a Reasor-

Hill fact situation will ordinarily lead to an action at law, a federal court sitting in Arkansas-whether it hears the case by reason

of diversity or because a federal question is involved-would
be required to follow the open door policy of that state as
enunicated in the principal case.

Jack Redden.

Where there is Congressional legislation such as the NORMIS-LAGUARDIA ACT, (47
70, 1932, 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 101 (1947), barring an injunction in the federal
courts which would be available in the state courts, the problem seems to be answered,
but the question is not clear as to whether federal courts may refuse an equitable
remedy available in a state court without legislation. Though under the view of Justice
Brandies in the Erie case ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,'
he they commercial law or a part of the law of torts") there is a possibility that the
Norris Act is unconstitutional as an attempt to restrict or expand remedies which
affect substantive law rather than to restrict or expand merely jurisdiction (as it was
proposed to do), unless the expansion or restriction comes within an express or implied
power of the Congress. See Comment, The Norris-LaGuardiaAct & Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 304 (1953).
35 The Erie rule is applied when jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity and
does not apply in suits (1) by the United States, (2) where a federal statute is involved
or (3) where federal questions are raised. See Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins;
The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1946); Gorrell and
Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years Alter, 9 Ohio S. L. J. 276 (1948) ; Clark, State Law
in the FederalCourts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 Yale L. J.
267 (1946).
34

STAT.

